INTRODUCTION
THE Civil Aviation Department of the Board of Trade defines public transport flights in its Annual Survey of Accidents as including all scheduled and non-scheduled passengercarrying flights and all scheduled and nonscheduled freight-carrying flights. Table 1 was prepared from data extracted from the annual surveys of the last few years and relates to accidents involving U.K. operators' aircraft engaged in public transport. The total number of accidents have ranged from ten to twenty-two annually; only four or less have been fatal in any one year. If this is expressed as a fatal accident rate, denned as the number of fatal accidents occurring Per 100,000 aircraft hours flown, the figure is no higher than 0-69 and in 1963 was actually nil.
These figures are not very different from the average figures for public transport avia tion throughout the world (Stanojovlik, 1967) . Table 2 shows the average fatality rate in four-yearly periods for all countries combined, excluding the Soviet Union and China. The U -K. figure for 1962-65 was 0-33 as com pared with the world figure of 0-32.
It is possible to juggle with figures and to express fatal accident rates in other terms, passenger miles, for example-when much lower figures will be obtained. It is obvious, however, as pointed out by the Board of Trade in the introduction to each annual survey, that deductions from such figures about comparative levels of safety from year to year, or as between different forms of public transport, must be made with extreme caution for aircraft accidents are "too scattered in time, too varied in nature and indeed too few in number to provide a reliable basis for statistical comparison between different years and different types of service."
An impression of increasing safety in avia tion is gained from such facts as the following (Stanojovlik, 1967) :
(i) in the period 1920-26, one in four commercial pilots were killed annually. This decreased to one in fifty in 1932 and by 1966 it was one in 1,600; (ii) 200 million people travelled safely on the world's scheduled air services in 1966 and insurance companies cur rently give a passenger a better than 40,000-to-one chance of making such an airline journey in safety.
However, although few in number, when it is noted (Table 1) that fatal accidents killed an average of nearly 100 persons annually during the years 1961-66, that this year already 162 have been killed and that with increasing passenger capacity, the same low number of accidents will kill an increasing number of people in the future, it is clear that there is no room for complacency. In the interest of improving flight safety, it is im perative that each accident be thoroughly investigated to discover the main and con tributing causes and to assess the safety fac tors from all aspects; in fatal accidents this implies a comprehensive medico-pathological 41 Every pathologist at every autopsy looks for the presence of natural disease. It is not, however, every pathologist's routine to go to the extent of comprehensive histology in each traumatic autopsy or to examine routinely blood, urine or tissues for the presence of carbon monoxide, alcohol or drugs in such cases. These omissions will result in the failure to detect such potentially important conditions as myocarditis or alcohol intoxica tion even though they be present. A post mortem examination of the bodies of the operative crew of any crashed aircraft should include a full routine histological survey of the major organs and a comprehensive toxicological screening of tissues, however un likely it may appear initially in a given accident that significant abnormality will be detected. In this context it must be admitted that comprehensive toxicological screening to include the detection of therapeutic quantities of any drug of potential importance as a main or contributory cause for an accident is not presently a practical proposition. It is hoped, however, that as a result of a research pro gramme just commencing at the Home Office Central
Research Establishment in co operation with our Department of Aviation Pathology, the ideal of such routine toxico logical screening may be achieved in the not too distant future.
Is AN ABNORMALITY FOUND A POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR THE ACCIDENT?
The question of whether any natural dis ease or abnormality discovered could be a possible cause for the accident is an initial theoretical exercise and involves answering two questions: (i) could the disease or condi tion discovered conceivably cause sudden, severe or incomplete incapacitation such that a man might involuntarily lose control of his aircraft or collapse onto the dual controls of an aircraft or in some other way interfere with a co-pilot's control of the machine? or (ii) could the condition be held to be one that might possibly affect the pilot's state of health, state of well-being and level of efficiency such as to make him unduly liable to make an error of skill or judgment in the handling of his machine, particularly if some form of emergency had already occurred? So far as the first question is concerned, forensic patho logists are perfectly well aware of those con ditions which could cause sudden collapse or death. So far as the second is concerned, it is of note that (Table 3) there have been something between 10 and 55 per cent, (average 46 per cent.) of public transport accidents attributed in part or entirely to pilot error in recent years. Franks (1959) has pointed out the possible importance of the summation of effects of minor contributory causes for accidents, and a study of the medical aspects of this might well be of value in suggesting more effective means of control and surveillance of aircrew.
From fourteen public transport accidents investigated during the last six years I have records of thirty-five pilots killed. Twenty of these suffered severe disintegrative mechanical trauma with or without incineration and the presence or absence of natural disease in them could not be determined. In ten, complete autopsy was possible and in a further five the autopsy was deficient only in that an examina tion for intracranial pathology was precluded by partial or complete decapitation. From these fifteen cases there were three cases of moderately severe coronary artery disease, Grade 2 severe (Mason, 1963) , one case of respiratory allergy and three cases of focal myocarditis-one being a doubtful one, but two being unequivocal. These figures suggest, therefore, that the presence of natural disease in pilots killed in public transport accidents is not uncommon.
DOES THE NATURAL DISEASE PROVIDE A PROBABLE EXPLANATION FOR THE ACCIDENT?
The finding of natural disease which could provide a hypothetical explanation for an accident on the basis of sudden unexpected incapacitation can only become a theoretical explanation with a degree of probability, if there is supporting evidence and little or no conflicting evidence. For example, changes of focal myocarditis were found in the left ven tricle (Figures 1, 2) , the interventricular sep tum and beneath the pericardium over the right ventricle from the First Officer of a freight-carrying aircraft. This aircraft was on a ground-controlled approach to land. The Captain announced changing to visual approach after breaking cloud and finding the aircraft nicely lined up for the runway.
The descent to about 100 feet continued normally but then the aircraft began a slow turn to one side. The angle of bank increased and the aircraft continued until it crashed into a factory roof about 1,000 feet to the side of the runway. Does the First Officer's myocarditis explain the accident? The micro scope alone cannot answer that question. In fact, microscopically the extent of the inflam mation was certainly more than minimal; there was evidence of myocarditis in more than a third of 110 slides prepared from eighteen representative blocks. These changes were as extensive or more extensive appa rently than in some of the cases in which Corby (1960) and Gormsen (1955) attributed sudden death to focal myocarditis.
However, a similar aircraft to the one that crashed was taken to a safe height and repeated attempts were made to reconstruct, on the basis of a complete collapse of the co-pilot, a similar flight path to that taken by the crashed aircraft. This was done with and without fastened seat belts and with and with out fastened shoulder harness. It was tried with the co-pilot at the controls and the pilot at the controls at the time a simulated incapacitation of the co-pilot was initiated. From these experiments it appeared impossible under any circumstances to ascribe the acci dent as it was seen to happen to a sudden collapse of the co-pilot from myocarditis.
Another accident in which an unequivocal myocarditis was found in the pilot is one in which civil litigation is currently in progress. It would not, therefore, be proper to recount the details at the present time. Suffice it to say, therefore, that the evidence to be con sidered consisted not only of the presence of a focal myocarditis, but also (i) the presence of a functioning cardio vascular system for a period after ground impact as shown by the pre sence of fat and bone marrow emboli in the lungs, (ii) the presence of potentially rapidly lethal injury to the pilot with the absence of evidence in the pilot of life during the post-crash fire, although the other members of the flight deck crew died from asphyxiation due to inhala tion of products of combustion, and (iii) the complication that engineering evi dence demonstrated malfunction of a certain instrument used to help the pilot judge his aircraft's attitude.
It was possible to construct a plausible if not completely satisfying explanation for the cir cumstances of the accident on the basis of a misjudgment by the pilot caused by his faulty instrument. But in that case, what of the myocarditis? Was it coincidental as in the case quoted above or was it the true cause of the accident, with the faulty instrument nothing more than a remarkable coincidence?
Such a case as this strongly emphasises the importance of correlating medical evidence with all the other evidence about the accident before a considered opinion is given as to the significance of the medical findings in relation to the cause of the accident.
Sometimes the evidence for an accident be ing caused by incapacitation of the pilot from disease appears overwhelming. This was so in an accident recently reported from the United States (Civil Aeronautics Board, 1967) in which all five crew and seventy-eight of the ninety-three passengers on board died. The aircraft was approaching to land. Local poor weather caused the pilot to make a lastminute change in his choice of runway for landing. At an altitude of about 1,200 feet he was making a right-hand turn to line up with the finally selected runway when the aircraft suddenly dived and crashed on high ground 350 feet below. The circumstances of the acci dent fitted the theory of loss of control result ing from an attack of coronary insufficiency in the pilot, with the co-pilot having had too little time (six seconds was estimated as the maxi mum) in which to regain control. The very gross coronary artery and coronary heart disease found in the pilot at autopsy also fit ted the theory; so did the fact that it transpired that the pilot had concealed a history of diabetes for three-and-a-half years and clinical heart disease for eighteen years! His angina pectoris had become increasingly severe during the last few years and he had received in creasing dosage of nitroglycerin and similar drugs. At his periodic medical examination for licence renewal, no abnormality had been detected and he had not confessed his symp toms or treatment.
THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF A NON-MEDICAL CAUSE FOR THE ACCIDENT
Medical findings may suggest a non medical cause for an aircraft accident. In one military aircraft accident (Mason, 1962) the medical evidence suggested that the pilot was in the passenger compartment when malfunc tion of the automatic pilot occurred and resulted in the accident; this later proved to be an accurate deduction. An electrical fire beginning in the radio equipment of an aircraft flying at altitude during a long haul over the sea could make it impossible to radio a dis tress signal. An attempt at ditching might follow and in rough seas could be unsuccess ful with the aircraft breaking up and sinking. Bodies alone might then be recovered and if they showed evidence of lethal impact injuries and raised carbon monoxide levels or other signs of life during fire, then the obvious deduc tion from such evidence would be that there had been a fire in the air.
There have been a number of instances of sabotage to aircraft in flight (Canadian Depart ment of Transport, 1966 , Civil Aeronautics Board, I960, 1962 . In two accidents I have investigated in recent years the possibility has had to be seriously considered. At Ndola, Rhodesia, in 1961, Mr. Dag Hammarsjkold, the United Nations Organisation Secretary-General, and his party of fifteen were killed when their DC6B crashed in the bush nine miles from the airfield. All bodies were X-rayed. In six there were metallic foreign bodies present in the cadavers and in two of these six the metallic objects included bullets ( Figure 3) . However, consideration of the tacts that the bullets (0 lay superficially in subcutaneous tissue, (ii) were not associated with any discernible bleeding, (>ii) did not show any "rifling," and per haps, most important of all, (rv) were accompanied by percussion caps and debris of disintegrated cartridge cases, made it clear that these bullets had not been nred by any firearm. The bodies in which they Were found were those of soldiers who had "Magazines of ammunition in their possession. lhe ammunition had exploded in the postcrash fire and bullets and cartridge cases had Penetrated the partially incinerated cadavers ne ar by.
A report from the United States (Civil ^ero nautics Board> i9 6 4) recor ds that the pilot on °u d a messa 8 e that a gunman had appeared fo flight deck ' ^ aircraft was later nnd to have crashed and all the evidence re Pported the conclusion that it was as a a 7? of the gunman's activities. The second of Ideiu on our files in which the possibility tainT 6 f0rm of sab°t age had to be enter-°e d was when the aircraft broke up in the air in apparently good weather conditions. Extremely methodical police mapping and labelling of bodies followed by full identifica tion of each individual body enabled plots to be prepared; comparison with the passengers' known seating positions enabled the conclusion that all occupants of the aircraft appeared to have been in their appropriate positions at the time of the catastrophe. There was nothing to suggest that the Captain had been back in the passenger compartment as, for example, in Mason's case quoted above, nor a passenger on the flight deck as in the U.S. case. Further, while the engineers' examination of the wreck age of the main fuselage and tail rapidly ex cluded a bomb having exploded in that part, the flight deck was not so easy to examine as it had broken off and had been gutted by fire. X-rays of the crew's burnt bodies helped to exclude the possibility of an anti-personnel or other explosive device having gone off in the crew compartment.
An extremely careful examination of all aircraft occupants, both at formal autopsy and by X-ray, is necessary if evidence of sabotage is not to be missed.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF EVENTS PRIOR TO AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
An aircraft which descended through cloud in a mountainous area after the Captain had declared his intention of staying at a safe alti tude to await expected improvement in local weather conditions struck the side of a moun tain. One of the problems presented was whether the descent was deliberate or the result of a sudden loss of control. Had the latter been the true explanation, particularly if it had been accompanied by excessive turbulence within the aircraft, it would have resulted un doubtedly in some of the aircraft's occupants being thrown about inside the cabin. This would have been likely to have resulted in bony injury with fat and bone marrow pul monary embolism arising, before the impact against the mountain caused immediate lethal injuries to all. Full histological examination of lung specimens from a representative 30 per cent, of the eighty-two passengers and cabin crew was made but there was no evidence whatsoever of any embolic phenomena. While by no means conclusive, this provided evidence 46 PETER J. STEVENS to offer to the commission of inquiry suggest ing that the aircraft's descent had not been due to loss of control with consequent violent changes in attitude, and supplemented non medical evidence suggesting a deliberate descent.
THE EVENTS AT IMPACT AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ACCIDENT
One of the most important considerations that arises following an accident in which there are both fatalities and survivors is whether the outcome could have been influenced by im proved design of the aircraft or its escape facilities. In such circumstances many questions arise, for example:
(a) Why exactly did those who were killed not escape? To provide answers to these, the autopsy evidence of cause of death, nature of injuries and life during post-crash fire must all be correlated with individuals' seating positions, the location of casualties as found by rescuers, the location of escape exits, the seat orientation and factors relative to each individual's immediate environment in the aircraft. All such evidence will be interpreted in the light of the survivors' evidence about the circum stances of their own escape and the evidence to be derived from a detailed examination of the aircraft wreckage.
An example of the potential value of assess ing all these factors is to be found in an acci dent in which the aircraft stalled on take-off, pancaked onto soft mud and snow, broke in two, skidded for some 400-600 feet and caught fire ( Figure 4) . Twenty of the twenty-seven Asphyxiation from fumes due to fire 15 No autopsy (religious reasons) but probably asphyxiation from fire 1 Asphyxiation-inhalation of blood 1 Multiple lethal injuries 1 Burns (died after some hours) 1 No cause demonstrated 1 passengers on board were killed, the other seven survived. The causes of death were as shown in Table 4 . Of the sixteen who were asphyxiated, six had evidence of injury in the form of a fractured spine, fractures of ribs, sternum or a long bone, or a combination of such injuries. These six all had pulmonary fat embolism and unequivocal pulmonary bone marrow embolism. Two further cases had ex tensive fat and bone marrow embolism but no evidence of the bony trauma from which these emboli had originated; as both bodies were extremely severely incinerated it may be accepted that fire had obscured the evidence of ante-mortem bony injury. In the remaining eight of the sixteen people who had been asphyxiated there was no microscopic or macroscopic evidence of injury to explain why they failed to escape. It may have been related to their seating position in the aircraft or to their receiving a minor concussive blow caus ing temporary partial incapacitation while the products of combustion enveloped them. The evidence of the survivors indicated that they had not used escape hatches. Rather they owed their escape to the fact that after recover ing from an initially dazed condition they realised that the fuselage beside them had broken away and that they had an unimpeded means of escape by clambering onto the wings and thence onto the ground. It was not pos sible to relate their initially concussed state to forward decelerative head injury though this mechanism may have played a part. Either they had no clinical evidence of head injury or the possibility was obscured by face and scalp burns. Vertical decelerative forces ap peared to have been greater in this accident than the forward decelerative forces, although these latter were not negligible, at least in the FATAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT AVIATION ACCIDENTS 47 forward part of the aircraft as shown by crew injuries (Figure 5 ).
The vertical forces could have produced a jolt sufficiently violent to cause a transient con cussion in those seated where forward decelera tion was minimal. The evidence on the significance of seat orientation was therefore equivocal in this case; however, although backward-facing seats might not have increased the number of survivors it was difficult to escape the impression that they would have done so to some degree.
One survivor described how he made his escape through an already opened door at the rear of the aircraft. This was of importance because it could be correlated with evidence in the aircraft wreckage. This evidence was (a) that the door through which he escaped had been manually operated from the inside in the normal way, (b) that a crew seat which must be tipped up to allow the door to be opened ( Figure 6 ) had been occupied at ground impact.
This enabled a reconstruction of the actions and fate of one of the cabin crew. He must clearly have recovered from the jolt of the accident quickly enough to begin to take the correct action. He had released himself from his seat, tipped it up, opened the door to faci litate escape and then gone forward to help passengers. He was one of those found to have died from asphyxiation without evidence of any impact injury, and must have succumbed while trying to rescue passengers. Such a reconstruction formed a basis upon which to consider suggestions about equipping cabin staff with respirators for use in similar circumstances. Examination of the bodies of the cabin crew who had occupied the forward crew seats showed that they too had died from asphyxia tion with apparently little or no serious incapacitating injury. They had a number of minor bruises, one had a bruise on the back of the head and the other a crack fracture of the sternum. These particular crew seats were backward-facing but not typical aircraft seats. They were not strong and had insubstantial head rests. They were located opposite galley shelves unguarded by doors. Sudden decelera tion of the aircraft had resulted in the pitching forward of the contents of these galley shelves and it appeared that these loose objects had caused some of the bruises and the fractured sternum. It seemed very possible that these two crew may have lost their lives because of inadequately stressed and padded seating, complicated by the effects of unguarded pantry equipment storage-both factors readily amen able to improved design.
Finally the preparation of a plan of the aircraft (Figure 7) to show the fate of the passengers relative to their seating position, the safety exits and the other factors already discussed often clarifies the various points in the reconstruction of events in the passenger compartment.
IDENTIFICATION OF BODIES OF THE CASUALTIES
It is evident from the foregoing that a pre requisite of many of the deductions to be made from a pathological investigation of a fatal aircraft accident is the identification of each individual body. This can be a substan tial task in itself. I have said elsewhere (Stevens, 1965 ) that although the identification part of a fatal aircraft accident investigation may be the work of a team including police, dentists, finger-print experts and others, it is, in my opinion, essential that the pathologist should supervise this team. If this is not done and if the pathologist is not able to examine the bodies exactly in the state in which they were recovered, it is possible that important evidence will be lost or obscured. I believe the best approach is a single combined examina tion of each body by the team of pathologist, dentist and policeman, beginning with photo graphy, removal and examination of clothing, jewellery and personal property, continuing with external examination of the body and radiological examinations if indicated and possible, and concluding with full autopsy, dental examination and the taking of speci mens for histology and toxicology.
As a result of adducing evidence of the time and mode of death in each individual and accurately identifying each body for accident reconstruction purposes, the pathologist is in a position to be of value to those dealing with the legal problems arising from the death of two or more members of the same family. If there is any evidence at all which will show the order in which they died, he is likely to dis cover it. I have found it usual to receive numerous requests from solicitors for certifi cates on this subject following a big aircraft disaster. CONCLUSION A Ministry of Aviation Committee report (1961) acknowledged the potential value of aero-medical specialists attending the scene of a major accident both in respect of their help in the assessment of safety factors and by their contribution to the determination of the cause for the accident or the elimination of possible causes.
The Committee stated: "It was suggested to us that doctors should be included in all accident investigation teams, but we recognise that this may not always be possible or neces sary," but concluded: "aero-medical specia lists should be called in at the outset where there is any possibility of human failure through illness, or other causes, or when lessons which could improve air safety may be learned."
We at the R.A.F.'s Department of Aviation Pathology fully endorse these views with the proviso that we do not believe that it is possible to assess accurately in advance the potential value of a pathological investigation into a particular fatal aircraft accident. Mason (1962b) has expressed this view with regard to military accidents and I know it to be true with respect to civilian accidents. We believe, therefore, that it is important that a routine comprehensive pathological investigation be carried out following every fatal aircraft acci dent even though early assessment of its likely value is pessimistic.
It is often held with justification that avia tion is not inherently dangerous. However, even to a greater extent than the sea, the air is very unforgiving of any human carelessness or neglect. The pathologist has an important role to play in the investigation of each and every fatal flying accident so that the precise cause of any human failing can be accurately determined.
Such comprehensive investigations can form the basis from time to time for appropriate steps to prevent further accidents from the same causes, or to prevent death and injury in similar accidents, and thus aviation can be made a still safer form of public transporta tion than it is at present.
